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ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to determine the place and role of corporate 
governance and performance measures in the efforts of managers to maximize shareholder 
value, and the attitude of Serbian corporations toward these issues. The paper first analyses 
the importance of corporate governance and performance measures in the context of value-
based management. Then, through the multiple case study, we investigate the attitude of 
seven Serbian corporations toward defining the general corporate objective, corporate 
governance, and performance measurement. Finally, we point out the factors and 
preconditions that determine corporate culture, objective definition, and performance 
measures used by Serbian corporations. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Companies face the different and often conflicting demands of a number of stakeholders. 
This problem is particularly evident when defining the primary objective of a company's 
business. Although companies often define their general business objectives as profit 
maximization, growth and development, and market share increase, none of these is 
sufficiently comprehensive to ensure that the requirements of all stakeholders are met. Some 
authors (Rappaport, 2006; Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 2000) suggest that the majority of 
modern companies, as a general objective (mission) of their businesses, identify shareholder 
value maximization, usually defined as the present value of future free cash flows. 
Shareholder value maximization is considered to be a sufficiently comprehensive objective to 
ensure the satisfaction of the requirements of most stakeholders (Stančić, 2006; Jensen, 
2001), and is a cornerstone of the value-based management (VBM) approach. 
 
At the base of all value creation models are several key value drivers that determine the 
amount and the present value of expected cash flows. These key value drivers are return on 
invested capital (ROIC), weighted average cost of capital (WACC), expected company 
growth rate, and competitive advantage period (the period during which the company expects 
to generate a difference between the return on invested capital and the weighted average cost 
of capital). The value is created when a company succeeds in achieving a positive 
performance spread, i.e., when ROIC exceeds WACC. Negative performance spread is a 
reliable sign that current business activity is destroying the value of a company. The amount 
of value created or destroyed is the product of invested capital and performance spread. 
 
Moskalev and Park (2010) suggest that the corporation must be built on the core concept of 
value, and that the firm’s organization, strategy, processes, communication, everything the 
firm does, must be consistently aligned with the key value drivers. They further suggest that 
if VBM is successfully implemented, then corporate culture will support and encourage 
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corporate governance mechanisms consistent with value creation at all levels within the 
organization. The link between corporate governance and corporate valuation has been 
investigated in several studies (Dahya et al., 2008; Durnev and Kim, 2005). These studies 
show that strong governance can protect the interests of minority shareholders and improve 
company performance, even more in countries with weak than in countries with strong legal 
protection of investors.  
  
This paper aims to investigate characteristics of internal governance mechanisms in the 
context of value-based management and the specific economic and cultural conditions within 
which corporations in Serbia operate. We conduct the analysis using a multiple case method 
on a sample of seven corporations in Serbia. We build our analysis on several previous papers 
that use the multiple case method to investigate similar corporate problems. We expect that 
our research will provide an insight into the corporate culture, corporate objectives, and 
performance measures used in the large publicly traded companies from different industry 
sectors in Serbia. This insight is the basis for understanding the factors influencing the 
corporate culture and governance of Serbian companies, and for the future theoretical and 
empirical investigation of this problem. 
 
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Value-based management (VBM) can be defined as a framework for targeting those business 
decisions that consistently add economic value to a company (Morin and Jarrell, 2001). It is 
also a managerial approach in which company objectives, systems, strategies, processes, 
performance measurements, and culture have as their guiding objective shareholder value 
maximization. The simple concepts behind VBM are value and value creation. The value of a 
company is determined by its discounted future cash flows, and value is created when a 
company invests capital at returns that exceed the cost of that capital. Copeland et al. (1994) 
point out that VBM extends these concepts by focusing on how companies use them to make 
strategic and operating decisions.  
 
Copeland et al. (1994) also suggest that VBM focuses on better decision making at all levels 
in an organization, and calls on managers to use value-based performance measures for 
making better decisions. Similarly, Todorović (2010) points out that value-based performance 
measures are particularly useful because they show managers how they can create value, 
while Kaličanin (2005) points out that these measures provide the motivation for managers in 
the selection and implementation of those options that maximize value. However, managers 
still often use measures based on accounting data (according to Fitzgerald, 2007). Although 
this approach is obviously simpler, it results in only partially accurate indications and 
suboptimal decisions, since accounting data weakly correspond with factors determining 
shareholder value (Čupić, 2011; Rappaport, 2006; Stewart 2003). This is confirmed in many 
empirical studies showing that value measures are more significantly related to shareholder 
returns than accounting measures (e.g., Wet and Toit, 2007; Wortington and West, 2004; 
O'Byrne, 1996). 
 
Although the original idea behind VBM was to align the measurement system with value 
creation in a way that accounting measurement systems did not, some authors suggest that 
too much focus on performance measurement caused serious problems in VBM 
implementation. For example, Koller et al. (2005) argue that many VBM programmes failed 
because companies developed objective and comprehensive value-based measurement 
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systems, but neglected management processes and corporate governance. Morin and Jarrell 
(2001) argue that investing in relationships with shareholders and other stakeholders can add 
value, while Rappaport (2005) believes that a company can better realize its potential for 
value creation by aligning the interests of shareholders and managers, and providing investors 
with value-relevant information.  
 
Some authors empirically investigate the importance of corporate governance for improving 
company performance. Dahya et al. (2008) and Durnev and Kim (2005) find that strong 
governance (primarily a strong board) can protect the interests of minority shareholders and 
improve company performance, and even more so in countries with weak than in countries 
with strong legal protection of investors. Coombes and Watson (2000) show that investors in 
the US and UK are willing to pay up to 18% more for shares of companies with good 
governance than for the shares of companies with similar performance but poor practice of 
corporate governance. Barton and Wong (2006) show that investors in developing countries 
are ready to pay from 20%-40% more for shares with good governance. Mitton (2002) finds 
that firms with higher disclosure quality, greater transparency, and higher outside ownership 
concentration experience better stock price performance during periods of crisis.  
 
The general model of corporate governance, aimed at resolving the agency problem that 
arises between the agent (manager) and the principal (shareholders), which is typical in 
economic systems with strong legal protection of investors where the roles of managers and 
owners are clearly divided (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), cannot be used as a starting point 
for investigating the relationship between corporate governance and company performance in 
developing economies. An insufficiently developed institutional context in developing 
economies makes the enforcement of agency contracts and protection of investors more 
costly and problematic (Wright et al., 2005). This results in the prevalence of concentrated 
firm ownership, which acts as the major governance mechanism in developing countries. 
Concentrated ownership, combined with an absence of effective protection of minority 
investors, results in more frequent conflicts between dominant (ultimate, controlling) 
shareholder and minority shareholders (Young et al., 2008; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), with 
negative consequences for firm performance.  
 
In developing countries with weak legal protection of investors, corporate governance is the 
means by which minority shareholders are protected from expropriation of their rights by 
managers and the dominant shareholder. Institutions that are important external governance 
mechanisms in developed countries, such as the stock exchange, securities regulators, 
institutional investors, and the judiciary, are weak in developing economies. A high quality of 
disclosure and strong boards of directors are, therefore, besides ownership concentration, the 
most important internal governance mechanisms in developing economies. Many authors 
stress the importance of internal governance mechanisms regardless of economy 
development. Morin and Jarrell (2001) pointed out that the three main areas of corporate 
governance are performance measurement, the compensation system, and investor 
communication, while Mitton (2002) put special emphasis on disclosure quality, ownership 
structure, and corporate diversification. La Porta et al. (1998) argue that accounting standards 
play a critical role in corporate governance by informing investors and by making contracts 
more verifiable.  
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3. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
 
3.1.  Context of the analysis 
 
Serbia has a civil law legal system, and belongs to the group of emerging and developing 
countries. In many studies (e.g., Johnson et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 2000) civil law countries 
have been linked with strong regulation but weak effective (institutional) protection of 
investors, particularly minority shareholders. In the case of Serbia this is confirmed in The 
World Bank global report Doing Business 2011, which shows that Serbia ranks better in legal 
(measured by strength of investor protection index) than in effective judicial (measured by 
enforcing contracts index) protection of investors. Among 183 economies Serbia is ranked 
74
th
 in protecting investors, and 94
th
 in enforcing contracts. Kaličanin (2005) argues that 
Serbian corporations are not motivated to be transparent in business and do not feel pressure 
from shareholders to deliver the required returns or to create value for them. The shareholders 
are subjects of attention only if they are dominant (which is often); but then the problem of 
protecting minority shareholders arises.  
 
The process of transition, which caused changes in the institutional and economic system and 
in the ways companies operate and in which managers and staff behave, has motivated some 
Serbian companies to introduce technology and management systems recognized and used by 
the successful companies operating in developed market economies (Bogićević Milikić et al., 
2008). For example, Bogićević Milikić and Janićijević (2009) show that performance 
evaluation systems (PES) have become an institutionally accepted way of operating in 
Serbian companies such as Tarket, Telekom Srbija, etc. Medicinal products manufacturer 
Hemofarm was one of the pioneers among Serbian corporations in using VBM 
methodologies. In the annual report for 2003 Hemofarm reports: “In the course of 2003 
Hemofarm Group introduced innovative instruments of monitoring financial performance in 
cooperation with the structurally major shareholder Aktiva. The “Economic Value Added” 
concept became the key instrument for performance evaluation at the Strategic Business Unit 
levels”.  
 
3.2. Research methodology 
 
The attitude of companies in Serbia toward value-based management, corporate governance, 
and performance measurement is relatively unknown. That is why we use the multiple case 
method, which is suited to researching unknown subjects (Bogićević Milikić and Janićijević, 
2009), i.e., for getting in-depth and first-hand understanding of a particular situation (Yin, 
2004). Yin (2004) defines the case study research method as an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, when the boundaries 
between the phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident, and in which multiple 
sources of evidence are used. Unlike single case studies, multiple case studies permit 
replication and extension between individual cases, which helps researchers to understand 
patterns more easily, to eliminate chance associations, and to form better theoretical structure 
(Eisenhardt, 1991). 
 
The multiple case method has been used in several studies on corporate governance and 
performance measurement systems (Bogićević Milikić and Janićijević, 2009; Chen and 
Guliang, 2009; Kennerly and Neely, 2002). While there is no ideal number of cases, a 
number between four and ten usually works (Eisenhardt, 1989), so we design a seven-case 
study. We analyse seven large (according to Serbian Accounting and Audit Law, RS Official 
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Gazette, Nos. 46/2006 and 111/2009) publicly traded companies. As in Chen and Guliang 
(2009) and Kennerly and Neely (2002), companies from different industry sectors and with a 
wide variety of competitive and organizational characteristics were intentionally chosen to 
introduce diversity into the sample, and to enable the identification of factors affecting the 
evolution of measurement in a variety of different circumstances. We also chose companies 
from different Belgrade Stock Exchange (BSE) markets (regulated and unregulated) because 
we wanted to investigate if listing requirements had influenced the way companies behaved. 
General characteristics of the companies involved in the research are shown in Table 1.  
 
The research took place during 2008, and the data was collected by referring to publicly 
available data (annual reports, Business Registers Agency, and company web sites), and 
through questionnaires and phone interviews with top managers and employees designated by 
the top manager. The questionnaire and interview were designed to get the answers to the 
following four questions:  
a) How does the company communicate with its shareholders? 
b) How does the company define its general and additional objectives?  
c) Is the company aware of the existence of the value-based management concept? Does 
the company use this concept, or try to implement it? 
d) What performance measures does the company use? 
This research is intended to provide an insight into the corporate culture, corporate 
objectives, and performance measures used in the large publicly traded companies from 
different industry sectors. This insight is the basis for understanding the factors influencing 
corporate culture and governance of Serbian companies, and for the future theoretical and 
empirical investigation of this issue. 
 
Table 1. Basic information on business cases 
Company Industry Total sales in 
2008 (000 €) 
Total assets in 
2008 (000 €) 
Belgrade stock 
exchange market 
1 Production of non-electrical household 
appliances 
35,515 40,537 Regulated 
market  
2 Production of rusks, biscuits, preserved 
pastry goods and cakes 
64,547 72,125 Unregulated 
market 
3 Production of soft drinks, mineral 
waters and other bottled waters 
71,880 78,674 Unregulated 
market 
4 Production of enamel, stainless steel 
and non-stick cookware 
6,300 39,317 Regulated 
market  
5 Production of furniture 62,591 190,214 Unregulated 
market 
6  Production of footwear, technical 
rubber goods and chemical products 
2,845 45,909 Regulated 
market  
7 Wholesaler of medications and medical 
products 
129,913 298,761 Unregulated 
market 
Source: Belgrade Stock Exchange, Business Registers Agency and company web sites 
 
 
3.3. Research findings 
 
We first analyse the ownership and board structure of the companies in our study. Table 2 
shows that all the companies in our study have a controlling shareholder. Controlling 
shareholder is defined as a single owner of voting rights in a company, providing that it 
controls at least 10% of the company’s votes (Dahya et al., 2008; La Porta, 1998). The mean 
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of equity holdings of the three largest shareholders is 56%, which is considerably more than 
in emerging (51%) and developed economies (41%), as reported by Young et al. (2008).  
 
The mean of board size is 8.43 directors, which is consistent with the 7-12 directors reported 
in several studies on boards of non-financial firms from developed and developing countries 
(Dahya et al., 2008; Andres et al., 2005). On average, independent directors account for 
30.08% of directors on the board, which is considerably less than the average proportion of 
independent directors (around 80%) reported for banks (Adams and Mehran, 2008; Andres 
and Vallelado, 2008), and the average proportion of independent directors (at least 38%) 
reported for non-financial firms (Dahya et al., 2008; Andres et al., 2005).  
 
The implication of these results is that the dominant shareholders of companies in Serbia tend 
to appoint weak boards, which can lead to serious conflicts between dominant and minority 
shareholders in the absence of developed external governance mechanisms. In addition, 
companies that are traded on the regulated markets of the BSE (1, 4 and 6) have a lower 
ownership concentration ratio, which could be due to the requirement for these companies to 
have at least 25% of shares in free float. These companies also tend to have smaller boards of 
directors and a lower proportion of independent directors on the board. 
 
Table 2. Ownership and board structure in the business cases 
Company Equity holding 
of the largest 
owner 
Equity holdings 
of the largest 
three owners 
Board 
size 
% of non-
executives on 
the board 
% of independent 
directors on the 
board 
1 24.77% 41.65% 7 57.14% 14.29% 
2 63.72% 69.61% 7 100.00% 28.57% 
3 58.07% 99.29% 7 100.00% 28.57% 
4 11.07% 24.69% 7 71.43% 71.43% 
5 44.26% 44.81% 11 63.63% 27.27% 
6 33.70% 47.02% 9 55.55% 22.22% 
7 23.02% 64.91% 11 63.63% 18.18% 
Mean 36.94% 56.00% 8.43 73.05% 30.08% 
Source: Authors’ Survey data 
 
We further analyse the way companies communicate with their shareholders. Table 3 shows 
that all the companies, except for company 5, use annual reports as the most important or 
second most important means of communication with shareholders, which is consistent with 
some recommendations for enhancing shareholder value (Morin and Jarrell, 2001). 
Companies also tend to communicate with shareholders at Shareholders’ Meetings, described 
by Strenger (2006) as the premier governance instrument for shareholders to directly 
articulate their concerns. Companies rarely use phone, mail, Internet, or dividend payments; 
methods of communication and signals that have become preferred in developed economies 
over the past ten years (Romanek and Lee, 2006).  
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Table 3. Communication with shareholders and companies’ objectives (summary of questionnaire results) 
Company How do you preferably 
communicate with your 
shareholders? (listed in order of 
priority) 
What do shareholders expect from your 
company? (listed in order of priority) 
What is the general (primary) 
objective of your company 
What are the additional objectives of your 
company? 
1 . 1. Annual reports 
2. 2. Internet 
3. 3. Press releases 
1. 1. Long-term stability 
2. 2. Growth and development 
3. 3. Market share increase 
Sustaining leadership position in 
core business  
 Expanding the range of other 
programmes  
 Penetrating new markets 
2 4. 1. Annual reports 
5. 2. Shareholders’ reps 
6. 3. Shareholders’ Meeting 
1. 1. Market share increase 
2. 2. Share price maximization 
3. 3. EPS maximization 
Profit maximization  Increasing market share, 
 Shifting towards more profitable 
products, 
 Strict cost management  
3 1. 1. Annual reports 1. 1. Long-term stability 
  
Profit maximization  Increasing the amount and value of 
production and sales 
4 1. 1. Annual reports 1. 1. Long-term stability 
2. 2. Growth and development 
3. 3. High dividend payments 
Profit maximization  Increasing market share,  
 Customer satisfaction  
 Employee satisfaction 
5 1. 1. Internet 
2. 2. Shareholders’ Meeting 
3. 3. Press releases 
1. 1. Growth and development 
2. 2. Long-term stability 
3. 3. Social responsibility 
Sustainable growth and 
development 
 
 Increasing sales 
 Increasing product quality  
 Increasing the number of employees 
6 1. 1. Shareholders’ Meeting 
2. 2. Annual reports 
3. 3. Internet  
1. 1. Growth and development 
2. 2. Long-term stability 
3. 3. EPS maximization 
Sustaining and creation of value 
for owners, business partners and 
employees 
 Profit maximization 
 Increasing market share 
 Increasing product quality  
7 1. 1. Shareholders’ Meeting 
2. 2. Annual reports 
3. 3. Phone and mail 
1. 1. Share price maximization 
2. 2. Long-term stability 
3. 3. Growth and development 
Long-term stability and profit 
maximization 
 Increasing market share 
 Increasing competitiveness 
 Social responsibility 
Source: Authors’ Survey data
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Companies traded on the regulated BSE markets offer more publicly available information 
and pay dividends to shareholders on an annual basis. Information on companies traded on 
the unregulated market is often hard to find, and these companies do not pay dividends on a 
regular basis. This is more often the case if a company has higher ownership concentration 
ratio and a lower proportion of independent directors on the board. This could be due to 
stricter criteria for listing on the regulated market, and the fact that controlling shareholders 
with larger equity holdings are less interested in shareholder expectations and dividend 
signalling. The implication of this finding is that the corporations in Serbia are interested in 
communication with shareholders only to the degree that is required by law or other 
regulations. This is consistent with studies showing that countries with civil law legal systems 
have strong regulation but weak protection of investors, particularly minority shareholders 
(La Porta et al., 2000). 
 
We continue our multiple case study by investigating the way companies include shareholder 
expectations in general and additional objective definitions. Table 3 shows that all the 
companies, except for company 2, believe that shareholders expect long-term stability from 
them, as opposed to four companies (2,3, 4 and 7), which list short-term profit maximization 
as their primary objective. Furthermore, two (2 and 7) out of four “profit maximization 
companies” list share price increase as the primary shareholder expectation. Share price 
increase is one of the elements of total shareholder return and in line with shareholder value 
maximization. Hence the controversy: this implies that the fact that a company recognizes 
shareholder expectations does not have to mean that the company is shareholder value-
oriented.  
 
The ability of companies 1, 5 and 6 to recognize long-term stability and sustainable growth 
and development and not to highlight profit maximization as the primary corporate objective 
implies that they take care of shareholders’ interests. Furthermore, managers in company 1 
state that they “make decisions consistent with the aim of exceeding the minimal required 
rate of return of 10%”, while managers in company 6 are focused on “obtaining and 
exceeding the rate of return expected by owners.” However, only companies 5 and 6 directly 
build shareholders’ expectations into their primary objective. Company 5 is completely 
dedicated to fulfilling shareholders’ expectations, since it defines its primary objective 
precisely as recognizing shareholders’ expectations – sustainable growth and development. 
Company 6 is the only company in our study that defines its primary objective as “sustaining 
and creating value for owners, business partners and employees,” i.e., as creating value for 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Besides company 6, traces of orientation to other 
stakeholders can be found in the objective definitions of companies 5 and 7, while other 
companies do not mention other stakeholders even in secondary objectives. Interestingly, 
companies 1 and 6, which are the only companies in our study that pay dividends on an 
annual basis, do not believe that shareholders expect high dividend payments. 
 
Table 4 shows that all the companies in our study use traditional accounting and market 
measures of performance. Company 6 uses the largest set of measures, and it is the only 
company in our study where other measures besides traditional accounting (net profit and 
earnings before interest and taxes) or market (dividend per share) measures are used. This 
company uses total shareholder return (TSR) and cash flow return on investment (CFROI). 
None of the companies use economic value added (EVA), market value added (MVA), or 
total business return (TBR). Companies tend to rely on traditional capital budgeting 
techniques (payback period and accounting rate of return), but all the companies use at least 
one discounted cash flow investment appraisal technique (net present value, internal rate of 
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return, or benefit/cost ratio). In four companies managers use payback period as a primary 
capital budgeting technique, which means that managers in these corporations are more 
interested in capital turnover rate (project liquidity) than in profitability. This fact can be 
explained by the lack of shareholder value orientation among companies in our study, as well 
as by the liquidity problems of Serbian corporations and the limited number of funding 
mechanisms. The majority of companies use internal rate of return, which again shows that 
Serbian corporations are concerned with the way each unit of capital is used.  
 
Table 4 shows that the managers of four companies have heard of VBM, while two 
companies implement VBM. Among companies that have never heard of VBM are 
companies 2, 3, and 4, which define their primary objectives as profit maximization. 
Company 1, which is shareholder value-oriented, has heard of VBM but does not implement 
it. Companies 5 and 6, which are identified as the most shareholder value-oriented, are the 
only companies in our study that actually implement VBM. Company 5 implements VBM 
with the help of several institutions and consulting agencies, while the managers of company 
6 state “VBM is in the basis of all the decisions made.” However, our finding and 
conclusions can be challenged by the fact that company 5 uses only accounting measures of 
performance, while company 6 uses payback period as the primary capital budgeting 
technique. Our findings concerning VBM application and performance measures are not very 
different from findings of some other studies (Bouwens and Van Lent (2007); Marr, 2004; 
Ryan and Trahan, 1999). 
 
We now turn to investigating the influence of the corporate governance characteristics of 
companies in our study on shareholder value orientation, objective definition, and 
performance measures used. Companies 2 and 3, which have the largest dominant owners, 
define their primary objective as profit maximization, which is certainly an acceptable 
objective for a dominant shareholder, but is not an acceptable objective for minority 
shareholders and other stakeholders. These two companies use only accounting earnings and 
ROA as performance measures, and have never heard of VBM. On the other hand, the three 
companies (1, 5 and 6) that were identified as the most shareholder value-oriented, and the 
two companies (5 and 6) implementing VBM, belong to the group of companies with lower 
ownership concentration (1, 4, 5, and 6), measured by the equity holdings of the largest three 
owners. 
 
In regard to the influence of the board structure as a second important variable of corporate 
governance, it seems that the percentage of non-executive and independent directors does not 
play a role in corporate shareholder value orientation, implementation of VBM, performance 
measurement, and capital budgeting techniques choice. Company 2 with 100% of non-
executive directors is the only one that does not list long-term stability as the shareholders’ 
expectation, has never heard of VBM, and quotes profit maximization as its primary 
objective. Similarly, company 3, whose board also consists entirely of non-executive 
directors, uses only accounting earnings and return on assets (ROA) as performance measures 
and payback period as its primary capital budgeting technique, states profit maximization as 
its primary objective, and has never heard of VBM. Company 4 is in the same situation, 
which is the company with the highest proportion of independent directors on the board. In 
contrast, companies that are value oriented (1 and 6) have the lowest percentages of non-
executive and independent directors. The implications of our findings concerning corporate 
governance are that ownership concentration is the major governance mechanism of Serbian 
corporations, and that the structure of the boards of directors is a weak governance variable 
(mechanism) in Serbian corporations. 
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Table 4. Value-based management and performance measures (summary of questionnaire results) 
Company What performance measures do you use? What capital budgeting techniques do 
you use? (listed in order of priority) 
Have you ever heard 
of VBM? 
Are you implementing 
VBM? 
1  Accounting earnings 
 Return on assets (ROA) 
 Dividend per share (DPS) 
1. Payback period 
2. Benefit/cost ratio 
3. Accounting rate of return 
Yes No 
2  Accounting earnings 
 Return on assets (ROA) 
1. Net present value 
2. Internal rate of return 
3. Payback period 
No No 
3  Accounting earnings 
 Return on assets (ROA) 
1. Payback period 
2. Accounting rate of return 
3. Net present value 
No No 
4  Accounting earnings 
 Return on assets (ROA) 
 Dividend per share (DPS) 
1. Payback period 
2. Internal rate of return 
No No 
5  Accounting earnings 
 Return on assets (ROA) 
1. Benefit/cost ratio 
2. Reciprocal of payback period 
3. Internal rate of return 
Yes Yes 
6  Accounting earnings 
 Return on assets (ROA) 
 Price-earnings ratio (P/E) 
 Dividend per share (DPS) 
 Total shareholder return (TSR) 
 Cash flow return on investment (CFROI) 
1. Payback period 
2. Internal rate of return 
3. Accounting rate of return 
Yes Yes 
7  Accounting earnings 
 Return on assets (ROA) 
 Price-earnings ratio (P/E) 
1. Net present value 
2. Internal rate of return 
Yes No 
Source: Authors’ Survey data
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Based on research findings, we identify several factors influencing corporate culture, 
corporate objectives, and choice of performance measures of large publicly traded companies 
in Serbia. These are: 
1) Civil law legal system - Serbia is a civil law country with weak de jure and de facto 
shareholder protection. Consequently, companies have a high degree of ownership 
concentration and tend to take shareholder interests and requirements into consideration only 
to the degree that is required by law and other regulations.  
2) Belgrade stock exchange (BSE) rules - Companies traded on the regulated (Prime and 
Standard) BSE markets communicate better with their shareholders. The reason is stricter 
rules for listing the shares on regulated than on unregulated markets.  
3) Funding mechanisms - Along with characteristics of the legal system, BSE does not 
provide incentives for using IPO as a funding mechanism for corporations. Therefore, 
corporations do not feel pressure from the capital market and shareholders to create high 
shareholder returns, pay dividends, and regularly inform shareholders.  
4) Uninformed managers – Managers of three of the surveyed corporations have never heard 
of value-based management, while managers of another three corporations heard about this 
concept thanks to Serbian scientific sources. That is, scientific and professional papers are 
available in the Serbian language, and several institutions (or agencies) provide consulting 
services in the area of value based management, but still many managers have not heard 
anything about value-based methodologies and value measures of performance. 
 
Bearing in mind key factors determining the relations between corporations and shareholders 
in Serbia, we identify two important preconditions for improving these relations. The first 
precondition is improvement of the legal framework. The New Law on the Capital Market 
(Official Gazette RS, No. 31/2011) relies on a new market development strategy advocating 
an upgrade of the stature of the BSE by removing from admission to trading those companies 
in which there is no significant trading interest. It provides better protection of shareholders’ 
rights and provides for the establishment of an Investor Protection Fund. The law also 
regulates public offerings, which could motivate corporations in Serbia to use this funding 
mechanism. Also, the new Law on Companies (RS Official Gazette, No. 36/2011), although 
not substantially different from its previous version, provides more detailed and precise 
provisions and allows corporations to choose between a one-tier and a two-tier board, which 
is in accordance with EU regulations. These two laws should provide a better legal 
framework for the operation of Serbian corporations, better protection of investors, and better 
communication between corporations and their shareholders.  
 
The second precondition is development of the BSE and strengthening of the Securities 
Commission by providing adequate supervision and enforcement. Along with a better legal 
framework that clearly defines the supervisory role of the Securities Commission by directing 
its focus on those regulatory activities that are the most important in achieving investor 
protection and fair and orderly trading of securities, this precondition should provide efficient 
functioning of the market and attract more individuals and foreign investors to the BSE. We 
believe that these two preconditions, as well as institutional investors and foreign direct 
investment, are going to significantly determine the direction and degree of the development 
of corporate governance and performance measures in Serbian corporations. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Value-based management places the need for an integrated approach to company 
management at the forefront, which includes the definition, implementation, and evaluation 
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of strategic and operational decisions with respect to the objective of shareholder value 
maximization. The performance measures developed in the context of value-based 
management are an important factor of value-based management implementation and 
business improvements. However, too much focus on performance measurement can cause 
serious problems in VBM implementation, as reported in several studies. Companies must 
also rely on governance mechanisms and comprehensive management processes in order to 
meet different information requirements and improve business performance.  
 
The ownership concentration in Serbian corporations is very high, while the proportion of 
independent directors on the board is small if compared to statistics reported from samples of 
non-financial firms in developed countries. In other words, dominant shareholders tend to 
appoint weak boards, which can lead to serious conflicts between dominant and minority 
shareholders. In the absence of strong boards, policy makers in Serbia should develop better 
legal and institutional mechanisms for protecting minority shareholders. Companies traded on 
the regulated markets of the Belgrade Stock Exchange have a lower ownership concentration 
ratio, tend to have smaller boards of directors and a lower proportion of independent directors 
on the board, and are more likely to take expected rate of return into consideration. 
 
Corporations in Serbia are interested in communicating with shareholders only to the degree 
that is required by law or other regulations. Companies that are not traded on the regulated 
markets of the Belgrade Stock Exchange have a higher ownership concentration ratio and a 
lower proportion of independent directors on the board, offer less publicly available 
information, and do not pay dividends on a regular basis. 
 
Corporations usually believe that shareholders expect long-term stability, growth, and 
development, as well as market share increase, but only three of them are really shareholder 
value-oriented. This means that, although a company can recognize shareholder expectations, 
it is not consequently oriented towards shareholder value maximization.   
 
All the surveyed companies use traditional accounting and market measures of performance, 
while none of the companies use EVA, MVA, or TBR. Only one company in our study uses 
total shareholder return (TSR) and cash flow return on investment (CFROI). Companies tend 
to rely on traditional capital budgeting techniques, but all the companies use at least one 
discounted cash flow investment appraisal technique. As for value-based management, we 
find that the three most shareholder value-oriented companies have heard of VBM, and two 
of them are actually implementing VBM. The implications of our findings concerning the 
relation between corporate governance and VBM are that ownership concentration is the 
major governance mechanism of Serbian corporations, and that boards of directors are the 
weak governance mechanism in Serbian corporations. 
 
Based on research findings, we identify four factors influencing corporate governance, 
corporate objectives, and choice of performance measures of large publicly traded companies 
in Serbia. These are the civil law legal system, the Belgrade Stock Exchange market on 
which company’s shares are traded, limited funding mechanisms, and uninformed managers. 
Bearing in mind these factors, we identify two important preconditions for improving 
relations between corporations and shareholders and the ability of corporations to create 
shareholder value: 1) improving the legal framework, and 2) the development of the Belgrade 
Stock Exchange and strengthening of the Securities Commission. We emphasize external 
factors and preconditions for improving relations between corporations and shareholders 
because the characteristics of Serbian culture (see Janićijević, 2003) and the legal system 
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foreground external incentives to managers’ and investors’ actions, and not internal or 
individual initiatives.  
 
Our research has several limitations, one of which is the small number of corporations that 
are investigated. However, we believe that it gives a useful insight into the corporate culture, 
corporate governance, and performance measures used in large publicly traded companies 
from different industry sectors in Serbia. This insight provides a basis for understanding the 
factors influencing the corporate governance and performance measurement systems of 
Serbian corporations, and for the future theoretical and empirical investigation of this 
problem. Future research should focus on investigating the particular business areas in which 
VBM is used and factors that limit or motivate the use of specific governance mechanisms or 
performance measures.  
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